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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Knox and Murray admit that achieving
an RMA in the absence of an identifiable foe as the focus of strategy presents
enormous difficulties. Be that as it may,
they warn, the obstacle the United
States presents to the ambitions of entities outside the Western alliance could
make it the object of someone else’s
RMA. Perhaps that is the greatest warning to arise from the coincidental appearance of this book following 11
September 2001. The Dynamics of Military Revolution raises critical questions
about how the United States might reshape its military to counter strategies
based on asymmetrical warfare. Beyond
the valuable contribution the book
makes to military history, one hopes
this volume will also help shape the national security debate currently in
progress.
BRIAN R. SULLIVAN

Vienna, Virginia

Gilbert, Marc Jason, ed. Why the North Won the
Vietnam War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2002. 254pp. $69.95

Since the fall of Saigon in the spring of
1975, Americans have sought to understand how their government could have
lost the Vietnam War. Given the enormous gap in resources between the
United States and the Vietnamese revolutionaries, it is difficult for even scholars of the war to explain why this
nation’s mighty military machine failed
to defeat its enemy’s forces. Many who
have written about the war have focused on the alleged mistakes of American civilian and military leaders,
arguing that more enlightened policies,
such as fewer restrictions on military
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operations or more emphasis on pacification, would have turned the tide in
South Vietnam. The purpose of the
eight essays in this volume is to place
American policies in a broader context—
or, as Gilbert writes, to recognize that
“the outcome of that war was determined less at MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] and
Washington than by the persistence of
the enemy on the battlefield and in political cultures of the Saigon regime, the
National Liberation Front, and its partners in Hanoi.”
The most original essays in this volume,
by William J. Duiker, George C. Herring, and Robert K. Brigham, pursue aspects of this theme. Duiker traces the
efforts of the government in Hanoi “to
manipulate the international and diplomatic environment to its own advantage” and its complicated relations with
China and the Soviet Union, allies
whose aid was vital to the North Vietnamese war effort. Herring emphasizes
the international dimensions of America’s defeat, noting how the inability of
the Lyndon Johnson administration to
gain support from European allies undermined the U.S. war effort. Brigham
challenges the traditional distinction
between northerners and southerners,
arguing that it is misleading to divide
“the struggle along geographical lines
that have no cultural or historical precedent.” Northerners, he argues, did
not make all of the key decisions in the
war; rather, southerners came to dominate party councils in Hanoi and were
able to convince their northern comrades to pursue a more aggressive strategy in the South.
The other five essays focus, with varying
degrees of success, more on the American
side of the war. In a forcefully argued
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essay, Jeffrey Record points out that those
who emphasize the failures of civilian
policy makers in Washington ignore both
the achievements of Vietnamese revolutionaries and “the defective professional
U.S. military performance in Vietnam
within the political limitations imposed
on the use of force.” If politicians were
stabbing the military in the back, “the
military also was shooting itself in the
foot.” He concludes that it is unlikely
that the United States could have done
more than increase the price of an enemy victory. John Prados analyzes the
uses of intelligence by both sides, emphasizing the difficulties of the Americans and South Vietnamese in
collecting accurate information, and
the extent of North Vietnamese and
Vietcong penetration of the Saigon
government and army. Gilbert challenges the views of Harry Summers,
Jr., and William E. Colby, both of
whom, he believes, fail to understand
that America in Vietnam was betrayed
“by its own collective limited vision of
the nature of the war and the requirements of victory.” Andrew Rotter examines the respective economic
cultures of America and North Vietnam
that shaped each side’s response to the
war, while Marilyn Young explores the
impact of the American peace movement,
suggesting that whatever its effect on the
length of the conflict, widespread protests
“increased the price to the government of
continued prosecution of the war.”
In a thoughtful reflection on these essays, Lloyd Gardner writes that “the reality of Vietnam was as elusive to
American policymakers as the enemy
forces were to the men they sent to this
hall of mirrors. They saw only their
own reflections, multiplied over and
over.” Like policy makers at the time,
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many historians have also been in a hall
of mirrors, preoccupied with the American side of the struggle. It is the great
strength of this volume that, at least in
part, it suggests the insights that can be
gained by moving beyond the American
perspective.
CHARLES E. NEU

Brown University

Peattie, Mark R. Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese
Naval Air Power, 1909–1941. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002. 392pp. $36.95

This work compellingly describes how
Japanese naval aviation, both land and
carrier based—like that of its principal
adversary in the Pacific War, the United
States—grew to maturity through trial
and error. Its maturation period extended from the earliest days of powered flight through the bloody crucible
of war with China. The story of U.S. naval aviation during this time is a familiar one, but that of the Japanese is less
so, due to the formidable barrier posed
by language. As more scholars equip
themselves with the tools necessary to
mine riches from the sources and publications of a former enemy, however,
the other side of the story is becoming
known. One such diligent student of
Japanese naval history is Mark R.
Peattie, familiar as the coauthor (with
David C. Evans) of the highly praised
Kaigun: Tactics and Technology in the
Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941
(Naval Institute Press, 1997). Holder of
a doctorate in modern Japanese history
from Princeton University and author,
coauthor, or editor of seven other
works, Peattie brings unique qualifications to the daunting task.
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